Niger Severs Intelligence Ties with Russia and Turkey Amid Escalating Security Strains

Niger’s ruling military council has officially cut off intelligence-sharing arrangements with Russia and Turkey, a move that underscores the nation’s mounting security woes and internal fractures. The decision, reportedly prompted by persistent dissatisfaction with foreign technical support, has left a critical gap in Niger’s surveillance infrastructure at a time of growing instability.

The Directorate General of Documentation and External Security (DGDSE), Niger’s lead intelligence agency, cited the underperformance of equipment and personnel provided by its Russian and Turkish partners—particularly in areas such as telecommunication interception—as the primary catalyst for ending the cooperation. In response, the junta turned to a Moroccan firm specialising in digital surveillance, supported by ARCEP, Niger’s telecommunications regulator.

However, this pivot swiftly collapsed when it emerged that the Moroccan company maintained indirect ties to a French private intelligence entity. Given Niamey’s firm disengagement from France, the military leadership acted decisively, dismantling the newly deployed system and plunging the country into an intelligence vacuum.

In the absence of a centralised surveillance capability, Niger’s Presidential Guard has assumed a makeshift security role. Night patrols—conducted by plainclothes officers on foot and motorcycles—now canvass sensitive sites across the capital, including key ministries, diplomatic zones, and high-traffic areas such as the Hospital Roundabout and Yantala district, between midnight and 6 a.m. These stopgap measures highlight the fragility of Niger’s internal security architecture and reflect the junta’s struggle to reassert control amid rising dissent within the armed forces.

Despite disengaging from direct intelligence operations with Moscow, Niger’s broader security entanglements with Russia persist. Alongside fellow Sahelian military regimes Mali and Burkina Faso, Niger recently signed a regional agreement with Russia’s state space agency, Roscosmos, to access satellite services for border surveillance and telecommunications. Finalised in Bamako, the deal is expected to enhance intelligence-sharing and regional coordination in tracking insurgent movements.

This paradoxical stance—rejecting operational support while embracing Russian technological assets—illustrates the CNSP’s conflicted security posture. It also reflects a strategic recalibration as Niger seeks to align more closely with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), formed in 2023 by the three military-led governments to bolster joint defence initiatives.

Meanwhile, Islamist militant groups continue to exploit Niger’s vast and porous borders, particularly in regions like Tillabéri and Diffa. The CNSP’s capacity to manage this threat appears increasingly constrained, with sections of the military reportedly challenging central command—a troubling indicator of potential fragmentation within Niger’s armed forces.

Compounding these challenges is a worsening socio-economic crisis. Although the country has made limited strides in agriculture, poverty remains widespread. The World Bank estimates that nearly half the population lives in extreme poverty, and humanitarian forecasts suggest that by the end of 2025, around 4.8 million Nigeriens will require assistance—over 3 million of them in urgent need of food aid. Additionally, Niger hosts close to one million displaced persons, many of whom reside in high-risk zones vulnerable to both climate shocks and armed violence.

As Niger navigates this volatile terrain—suspended from ECOWAS and under increasing scrutiny from regional partners—the junta must balance its sovereign security goals with the practical demands of rebuilding a functional intelligence infrastructure. Without reliable external partnerships or a robust domestic defence industry, its ability to manage insurgency threats and maintain internal cohesion remains in serious question.